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Abstract: 
 
The aim of this article is to bring together different legal, political science and sociological 
perspectives addressing the problem of Europeanization of national judiciaries. In that sense, this 
article provides an overview of several old aspects regarding the way and extent national 
courts/judges adapted to their role of European judges. Next to that, it is looked into the manner of 
and reasons behind judges’ involvement in the process of EU legal integration, whereby a new 
research agenda is offered. For that purpose, new questions are raised and different empirical 
aspects are discussed concerning, for instance, courts compliance with EU law, the relevance of 
national judges’ individual profiles (knowledge, attitudes and values) but also the role of 
institutions (networks) and legal systems in the process of Europeanization of judges. 
 
KEYWORDS: Europeanization, national judiciary (courts and judges), Court of Justice of the 
European Union, CJEU, interdisciplinary, EU legal system. 
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A. INTRODUCTION 
It is now common knowledge that national courts of Member States, regardless of their position in the 
national legal system and the field of adjudication, are the key players in the processes of application 
and enforcement of European Union (EU) law 1 and the process of EU integration in general They are 
the core enforcers of the rights and obligations individuals derive from EU law, responsible for 
ensuring the effectiveness of EU law. They are also expected to participate in the process of legal 
integration within the EU through the preliminary ruling mechanism. The fact that EU law can directly 
affect interests of individuals in the EU, and may be invoked and relied upon by them before national 
courts, which are in turn obliged to protect their EU rights, has tremendous implications for the 
functioning of national judiciaries and the system of judicial protection in the European Union. For the 
foregoing reasons the national courts are also referred to as decentralized EU courts.2 
In light of the foregoing, one might wonder whether and how the process of EU integration 
and EU law as such have affected the functioning of national courts and changed the structure of 
national judiciaries. Indeed, the issue concerning the functioning of national courts as enforcers of EU 
law and the way EU law impacted on the functioning of national courts, has been and will likely remain 
one of the most constitutive, complex and intriguing aspects related the phenomenon of EU 
integration. For decades now, scholars of different disciplines have been interested in the question why 
national courts participate in this process of legal integration in the EU and what factors (might) 
influence the manner national judges behave. They addressed for instance issues concerning the 
cooperation between the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and national courts, the role 
national litigants play in the preliminary reference procedure or the reasons of accepting the principles 
of primacy and direct effect of EU law by national judges. In that respect, the issue concerning the 
process of cooperation between the national courts and the CJEU in the framework of the preliminary 
procedure has gained tremendous attention on part of scholars whereby the topic has been elevated to 
the one of the most important aspects of ‘Europeanization’3 of national judiciaries. Next to that, there are 
many invaluable legal contributions discussing the application of EU law by national courts but those 
                                                 
1 U.Jaremba, National Judges As EU Law Judges: The Polish Civil Law System (Brill Nijhoff 2014).  
2 Jaremba 2014.  
3 At this point it should be strongly emphasized that in the framework of Europeanization many different processes, next to 
the process of integration within the European Union, could be identified which impact on and transform national 
judiciaries. In that respect, the relevance of the internationalization of national judiciaries through their interfaces with the 
European Court of Human Rights and other international courts must be underscored, see J.Christoffersen, M.R.Madsen 
(eds.) The European Court of Human Rights between Law and Politics (Oxford University Press 2011); K.J.Alter. The New Terrain of 
International Law: Courts, Politics, Rights (Princeton University Press 2014) among others. In this article, we limit the study to 
the problem of influence that is exerted by EU-related factors which result in turning national judges into EU judges: a 
problem which offers a vast collection of topics for analysis.  
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mostly focus on individual cases and the legal correctness of the way national judges proceed with 
(apply) EU law. 4  On basis of the findings following from this stream of research, scholars draw 
sometimes far going conclusions concerning the process of Europeanization of national judiciaries. 
However, so far the knowledge about the general impact of the process of Europeanization on the 
judiciary is somewhat limited5 and scattered. Only few scholarly efforts have been made which assess, 
for instance, how different institutional or sociological factors (may) bear on the judicial behaviour and, 
consequently, on the processes of EU law application6 which very much supports the desirability of 
further research in the area of Europeanization of national judiciaries. In particular, the issue 
concerning the relevance and pressure that the Court of Justice can exert through the dynamic of its 
judgments on national courts should be emphasized.7 It is one of the aims of this article to argue that 
the rates of preliminary references from national courts to the CJEU do not necessarily correspond 
with all the modes that national judges use to engage with and apply EU law. In other words, studies 
focusing on the preliminary reference procedure do not seem to satisfactorily reflect the entire picture 
                                                 
4 See for instance M.Jarvis, The Application of EC Law by National Courts. The Free Movement of Goods (Clarendon Press 1998); 
Z.Kühn, ‘The Application of European Law in the New Member States: Several (Early) Predictions’, 6 German Law Journal 
(2005) p. 563; M.Andenas, F.Jacobs (eds), European Community Law in English Courts (Oxford University Press 1998); 
M.Bobek, ‘Learning to Talk: Preliminary Rulings, the Courts of the New Member States and the Court of Justice’, 45 
Common Market Law Review (2008) p. 1611; M Bobek, ‘On the Application of European Law in (Not Only) the Courts of 
the New Member States: 'Don't Do as I Say'?’, 10 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies (2007-2008) p. 1; 
T.Evas, Judicial Application of European Union Law in post-Communist Countries. The Cases of Estonia and Latvia (Ashgate 2012); 
A.P.Komninos, EC Private Antitrust Enforcement. Decentralised Application of EC Competition Law by National Courts (Hart 
Publishing 2008); A.Łazowski (ed), The Application of EU Law in the New Member States. Brave New World (T.M.C Asser Press 
2010); R.Mehdi, ‘French Supreme Courts and European Union Law: Between Historical Compromise and Accepted 
Loyalty’, 48 Common Market Law Review (2011) p. 439; Y 2011. 
5 J.Jupille, J.Caporaso, ‘Domesticating Discourses: European Law, English Judges and Political Institutions’, 1 European 
Political Science Review (2009) p. 205; S.A.Nyikos, ‘Courts’, in P.Graziano and M.Vink (eds), Europeanization: New Research 
Agendas (Palgrave Macmillan 2008). 
6 T.Börzel, ‘Participation Through Law Enforcement: The Case of the European Union’, 39 Comparative Political Studies 
(2006) p. 128; M.Claes, The National Courts’ mandate in the European Constitution (Hart Publishing 2006); G.Davies, ‘Activism 
relocated: the self-restraint of the European Court of Justice in its national context’, 19 Journal of European Public Policy 
(2012) p. 76; Jupille, Caporaso, supra n. 4; D.Kelemen, Eurolegalism: The Transformation of Law and Regulation in the European 
Union (Harvard University Press 2011);  W.Mattli, A.-M.Slaughter, ‘The Role of National Courts in the Process of European 
Integration: Accounting for Judicial Preferences and Constraints.’ in A.-M.Slaughter, A.Stone Sweet and J.H.H.Weiler (eds), 
The European Court and National Courts - Doctrine and Jurisprudence: Legal Change in its Social Context (Hart Publishing 1998); 
R.Slepcevic, ‘The judicial enforcement of EU law through national courts: possibilities and limits’, 16 Journal of European 
Public Policy (2009) p. 378; A.Stone Sweet, K.Stranza, ‘Rights adjudication and Constitutional Pluralism in Germany and 
Europe’, 19 Journal of European Public Policy (2012) p. 25; M.Wind, D.S. Martinsen and G.P. Rotger, ‘The Uneven Legal 
Push for Europe. Explaining Variance when National Courts go to Europe’, 10 European Union Politics (2009) p. 63; Y 
2014.  
7  S.Schmidt, ‘Beyond Compliance: The Europeanization of Member States through Negative Integration and Legal 
Uncertainty’, 10 Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice (2009) p. 299; D.Panke, ‘The European 
Court of Justice as an agent of Europeanization? Restoring compliance with EU law’, 14 Journal of European Public Policy 
(2007) p. 847; D.Martinsen, ‘Judicial policy-making and Europeanization: the proportionality of national control and 
administrative discretion’, 18 Journal of European Public Policy (2011) p. 944.  
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of the process of Europeanization of national judiciaries. Hence, in line with Nyikos, we suggest to go 
beyond the problem of preliminary references as a proxy of Europeanization of national courts. 8 
It is the central ambition of this contribution to critically revise, from an interdisciplinary 
perspective, the scholarship that addresses the issue of Europeanization of national courts. In this 
revision we argue in favour of a broader research agenda and propose new research questions 
concerning the EU-peanization of national judges, which will facilitate embracing the project of 
constructing a composite framework of Europeanization measures. Such a composite framework is 
aimed at bringing together different indicators concerning a number of various dimensions of judges’ 
involvement in the process of EU legal integration. For that purpose, different political science, legal 
and sociological perspectives dealing with the problem of Europeanization of national courts are 
brought together in this article. Thus, based on a broader notion of Europeanization of national 
judiciaries, this article offers an overview of several aspects regarding the way and extent national 
courts/judges adapted to their role of EU judges. This is done thorough discussing old and recent 
(empirical) findings concerning, for instance, various aspects of courts interaction and compliance with 
EU law and the CJEU’s jurisprudence, the relevance of national judges’ individual profiles (e.g. 
knowledge and attitudes) but also through evaluating the role of institutions (e.g. networks) and legal 
systems for the process of Europeanization of judges. 
 The structure of this article is as follows. First, the concept of Europeanization and its 
core features are clarified which is done through a revision of the different dynamics or processes 
proposed for covering the process of Europeanization of national courts. This is then followed by 
analysis of the vertical mechanism and indicators of Europeanization of courts, mainly based on the 
interaction of national judges with EU institutions. Next, the relevance of horizontal mechanisms (such 
as judicial networks, associations or personal links) for the process of Europeanization of national 
judiciaries is discussed. Subsequently, the paper addresses the contribution of sociological approaches 
and methodologies to our understanding of the socialization of national judges into the EU legal order. 
Finally, several general conclusions are drawn.  
 
THE CONCEPT OF EUROPEANIZATION 
                                                 
8 Nyikos, supra n. 4. In her seminal work the author underlined the necessity to deepen the study of the Europeanization of 
national legal systems and courts, identifying the core research questions concerning the Europeanization that scholars have 
tried to address. She observed that there is too little study on the effects of Europeanization on domestic courts, and that 
the research that has been done so far has been mainly focused on the reasons of referring preliminary questions to the 
CJEU by national courts and the rationale behind the acceptance of the principle of primacy of EU law by national courts. 
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As observed by Olsen, Europeanization is a ‘fashionable but contested’ concept, and even an ‘academic 
growth industry’.9 The broad term is used in various branches of legal, social, political sciences and 
history and it also has its own meaning and context in all of those areas. Regardless of the context, the 
term always refers to a process of domestic adaptation in a specific area that results from the 
membership in the EU. In connection to EU law and its implementation at the domestic level, the 
concept of Europeanization is widely used. However, there seems to be no agreement regarding the 
concept of Europeanization in case of national courts. As argued by Olsen ‘the term is applied in a 
number of ways to describe a variety of phenomena and process of change. No shared definition has 
emerged and definitions are often delimited to a specific article or book chapter.’10  
 For the purpose of this article and in line with the idea of decentralized EU courts, we 
define Europeanization as the transformation of the national judiciary/judges11 into European Union 
judges. Therefore, we assume that national courts should share the capability, skills, knowledge, 
institutional structure and resources, and/or epistemic frameworks, principles or values in order to be 
able to assure the correct application of EU law and to function as truly EU judges. However, in this 
contribution we do not limit ourselves to the effects or dynamics of the Europeanization on national 
judges, but also consider the causes or arguments that are suggested to explain it. 
 At this point it is important to agree with Howell who argues that the relationship 
between Europeanization dynamics (causes) and Europeanization of the judiciary (effects) is interactive 
and the distinction may be obscure or endogenous.12 In this sense, Europeanization may become a 
process of triggering of or even pushing for more integration of those aspects of domestic judiciaries 
that are not Europeanised yet. Also, one must be aware that the Europeanization of national judiciaries 
is closely related to the transformations of the domestic legal orders produced by the integration of EU 
law into them. Put differently, the necessity to adjust national legal orders to EU law affects the judicial 
systems or the understanding of common legal values. 
 In this research both top-down and bottom-up dynamics or processes in the process of 
Europeanization of national judiciaries are identified. While the top-down dynamics, which are 
                                                 
9 J.P.Olsen, ‘The Many Faces of Europeanization’, 40 Journal of Common Market Studies (2002) p. 921. 
10 Olsen, supra n. 8, p. 921.  
11  The process of Europeanization is not only limited to Member States judiciaries. See A.F.Tatham. ‘“Emulate thy 
neighbour?” How dialogues between the CJEU and non-EU courts could be explained through international relations 
theory’ in B.De Witte, J.A.Mayoral, U.Jaremba, M.Wind and K.Podstawa (eds), National Courts and EU law (Edward Elgar 
Publishing 2016). 
12 K.Howell, ‘Conceptualisations of Europeanization: Developing Methodological Approaches’, 3 Queens University On-
Line Journal (2004) p. 1.  
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sometimes referred to as downloading process13, track the impact of institutions (CJEU, EU legislator 
and European judicial networks), procedures (preliminary references, daily EU law application, 
socialization at European institutions) or policies (EU legislation or CJEU jurisprudence) from the 
European level into the domestic level, the bottom-up dynamics, also called uploading processes 14 , 
indicate that changes depart from the Member States/national actors (e.g. high courts, national judicial 
councils, training schools, universities and networks) and the effects are tracked up to the level of EU 
or other Member States15. Put differently, in case of top-down processes the national judiciary adapts 
and conforms to the European policy, whereas the bottom-up Europeanization starts at the level of 
Member States, between national judges and other domestic actors, and results in changes at the 
European level which are later disseminated among the rest of Member States. This perspective 
explains Europeanization produced by the transfer of ideas or policies between EU Member States 
based on mutual recognition, soft law and best practices. A good illustration of a bottom-up process in 
case of the judiciary is for instance the way national courts influence the development of EU law 
principles and values16, i.e. the way the German Constitutional Court shaped the development of the 
principle of primacy of EU law and its reception by other national higher courts. Finally, we refer to the 
horizontal processes or dynamics where the interaction between national judges and actors exclusively 
affects the level of Europeanization of judges at the national level. As the previous one, the procedures 
affecting Europeanization also refer to soft law mechanisms. A good example of a horizontal dynamic 
is the influence formal and informal domestic or transnational networks or judicial training schools 
exert on improving the knowledge of EU law, boosting the cooperation between domestic actors or 
disseminating European concepts among the judiciary. 
                                                 
13 See T. Börzel, ‘Pace Setting, Foot-Dragging, and Fence-Sitting: Member State Responses to Europeanization’, 40 Journal 
of Common Market Studies (2002) p. 193.     
14 Börzel, supra n. 12. 
15 T.Hoch Jovanovic. ‘Reinventing national minority rights through European integration: from top-down to bottom-up 
Europeanisation’, PhD Thesis. Roskilde Universitet 2014, at p. 53-54.  
16 See F.G.Jacobs, ‘Judicial Dialogue and the Cross-Fertilization of Legal Systems: The European Court of Justice’, 38 Texas 
International Law Journal (2003) p. 547 at p. 549.  
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Figure 1: Europeanization dynamics 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
With regard to the foregoing it should be observed that top-down dynamics are mainly (but not 
exclusively) related to vertical mechanisms or processes through which Europeanization happens defined as 
traditional, direct and formal based on deference and coercion.17 Horizontal mechanisms, then, refer to 
those processes where no pressure for (domestic) adjustment or a direct need to conform to a policy 
exist, i.e.: the transformation is established through networking, arguing, persuasion, socialization or 
learning or exchange of experiences.18 Top-down are mainly defined by vertical mechanisms, while 
horizontal mechanisms play a role in both bottom-up and strictly horizontal dynamics. However, more 
recent scholarship illustrate how soft or non-coercive mechanisms like trust19 can also mediate the top-
down dynamics. In this article, the dynamics that seem most relevant and significant to cover the 
phenomenon of Europeanization of national judiciaries are reviewed. 
 
TOP-DOWN EUROPEANIZATION: BEYOND THE USE OF PRELIMINARY REFERENCES 
As mentioned in the introduction, this article aims at going beyond those traditional top-down models 
that use preliminary references as the main indicator of the process of Europeanization of national 
courts. One could namely put forward that the way national judges use the preliminary ruling 
                                                 
17  C.Radaelli, ‘The Europeanization of Public Policy’ in K.Featherstone, C.Radaelli (eds), The Politics of Europeanization 
(Oxford University Press 2003) p. 27 at p. 41; R. Ladrech, Europeanization and National Politics (Palgrave 2010).   
18 Radaelli, supra n. 16, p. 41; T.Börzel, T.Risse, ‘From Europeanization to Diffusion: Introduction’, 35 West European 
Politics (2012) p. 1. 
19 J.A.Mayoral, 2015. ‘Disentangling judicial trust in International Courts: The case of the European Union.’ International 
Organizations workshop: The Judicialization of International Relations. Northwestern University, Chicago. 
EU 
Member 
States 
Horizontal 
Member 
States 
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mechanism does not  allow to fully to assess the varieties of the national and EU-induced dynamics 
affecting judges’ behaviour and attitudes towards EU legal system. Most of the preliminary-ruling-
focused studies share the idea that legal integration has been fostered by the cooperation between 
national courts and the CJEU and elaborate on how the legal, social and political context determined 
the success of the preliminary references mechanism and the implementation of CJEU rulings by 
national courts. In these studies, the main focus is put on the internal establishment of the formal 
procedure of preliminary references and its consequences for the creation of a European judicial 
hierarchy and/or acceptance of principles such as primacy and direct effect. Empirically, these 
contributions are mainly focused on ‘the level of Europeanization on the number of references to the 
CJEU or on the relative annual increase in references to the Court.’20 
Different reasons of the engagement of national courts in the preliminary ruling mechanism are 
proposed. In that regard one may list the scholarship by Weiler21 and the followers of his judicial 
empowerment theory vis-à-vis other domestic institutions, such as Mattli and Slaughter22  or Alter23. 
Next, the scholarship by Garrett; Kelemen, Schulz and Weingast24, Golub25 should be mentioned. In 
contrast to these political accounts, Micklitz and Ramos argue that courts of the Member States 
                                                 
20 N.Corkin, ‘2-Stage Europeanisation and Constitutional Courts in Germany, Austria and Italy’, 6 Journal of Politics and 
Law (2013) p. 46 at p. 48.  
21 J.H.Weiler, ‘A Quiet Revolution: The European Court of Justice and Its Interlocutors’, 26 Comparative Political Studies 
(1994) p. 510. The author pointed out that the judiciary became involved because the preliminary references system 
provided them with a new mechanism for reviewing the acts of legislative and executive branch. At the same time, this 
cooperation between national courts and the CJEU gradually promoted the acceptance of the doctrines of supremacy, direct 
effect, and implied powers. 
22 See Mattli, Slaugher, supra n. 5, also A.J. Obermaier, ‘The National Judiciary—Sword of European Court of Justice 
Rulings: The Example of the Kohll/Decker Jurisprudence’, 14 European Law Journal (1998) p. 735; A.J.Obermaier, The 
End of Territoriality?: the Impact of CJEU Rulings on British, German and French Social Policy (Ashgate Publishing Limited 2009); X 
2013a. 
23 K.J.Alter, Establishing the Supremacy of European Law: The Making of an International Rule of Law in Europe (Oxford University 
Press 2001). Alter assumes diverse institutional incentives for each type of courts and argues that lower courts use EU law 
to increase their prestige and power in relation to higher courts, which, in turn, defend the prevalence of the national legal 
system to safeguard their power; see Alter, ‘Explaining National Court Acceptance of European Court Jurisprudence’ in A.-
M.Slaughter, A.Stone Sweet and J.H.H.Weiler (eds), The European Court and National Courts - Doctrine and Jurisprudence: Legal 
Change in its Social Context (Hart Publishing 1998). See also A.Dyevre ‘European Integration and National Courts: Defending 
Sovereignty under Institutional Constraints?’, 9 European Constitutional Law Review (2013) p.139; P.J.Castillo. EU Treaties 
and the Judicial Politics of National Courts. A Law and Politics Approach (Routledge 2016). 
24 Inter-governmentalist/neo-realist explanations have defended the acceptance of the supremacy and direct effect doctrine 
by national courts considering national governments’ preferences towards the EU.  See G.Garrett, ‘The European 
Community's Internal Market’, 46 International Organization (1992) p. 533; G.Garrett, ‘The Politics of Legal Integration in 
the European Union’, 49 International Organization (1995) p. 171; G.Garrett, R.D.Kelemen and H.Schulz, ‘The European 
Court of Justice, National Governments, and Legal Integration in the European Union’, 52 International Organization 
(1998) p. 149; G.Garrett, B.Weingast, ‘Ideas, Interests and Institutions: Constructing the EC's Internal Market’ in 
J.Goldstein, R.Keohane (eds), Ideas and Foreign Policy (Cornell University Press 1993), at p. 173; see also M.L.Volcansek, 
Judicial Politics in Europe: An Impact Analysis New York (Peter Lang 1986).  
25 J.Golub, ’The politics of judicial discretion: Rethinking the interaction between national courts and the European Court of 
Justice’, 19 West European Politics (1996) p. 360.  
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primarily cooperated with the CJEU to reach a resolution of disputes.26 Legal neo-functionalist models 
by Stone Sweet and Brunell argue that judges refer their questions to the CJEU to solve the disputes in 
those areas that are affected by an increasing transnational economic exchange.27 Finally, authors such 
as Carrubba and Murrah, Wind, Martinsen and Rotger or Hornuf and Voigt suggest that the 
configuration of the national legal order and judicial review powers28, the democratic or political culture 
of judges29, the influence of public opinion on judges30, and the familiarity with EU law or the length of 
the democratic system31 may influence judges’ preliminary-ruling-favourable behaviour. It goes beyond 
the scope and aim of this article to list the entire line of the concerned scholarship as it can be assumed 
that the audience of this journal is well familiar with most of the mentioned contributions. Therefore 
they are not going to be discussed here in more detail.32  
It is now evident that scholars have identified many various factors that assess the national 
variations between reference rates to the CJEU. Alter and Vargas argue, however, that study of CJEU 
preliminary references as an indicator of the judicial involvement in the EU legal integration process is 
a mistake, since many EU-law-related cases in national courts are decided without direct involvement 
of  the CJEU.33 Figure 2 displays quantitative evidence supporting this argument, by showing how the 
total number of EU-law-related cases from national administrative courts in EU-15 doubles the 
                                                 
26 H.W.Micklitz, The politics of judicial cooperation in the EU. Sunday trading, equal treatment and good faith (Cambridge University 
Press 2005), at p. 433. F.Ramos, ‘Judicial cooperation in the European courts: testing three models of judicial behavior’, 2 
Global Jurist Frontiers (2002) p.1 at p.10. 
27 A.Stone Sweet, T.Brunell, ‘The European Court and the National Courts: A Statistical Analysis of Preliminary References 
1961-95’, 5 Journal of European Public Policy (1998) p. 66.  
28 J. C. Carrubba, L. Murrah. ‘Legal Integration and Use of the Preliminary Ruling Process’, 59 International Organization 
(2005) p. 399; see also M.Vink, M. Claes and C. Arnold, ‘Explaining the Use of Preliminary References by Domestic Courts 
in EU Member States: A Mixed-Method Comparative Analysis’, Paper presented at the 11th Biennial Conference of the 
European Studies Association (2009). L.Conant, ‘Europeanization and the Courts: Variable Patterns of Adaptation among 
National Judiciaries’, in M.Green Cowles, J.A. Caporaso and T.Risse (eds), Transforming Europe. Europeanization and Domestic 
Change (Cornell 2001), at p. 97. L.Hornuf, S.Voigt, ‘Preliminary References — Analyzing the Determinants that Made the 
ECJ the Powerful Court it is’, CESifo Working Paper Series (2012) No 3769.  
29 M.Wind, D.S.Martinsen and G.P.Rotger, ‘The Uneven Legal Push for Europe. Explaining Variance when National Courts 
go to Europe’, 10 European Union Politics (2009) p. 63. M.Wind, ‘The Nordics, the EU and the Reluctance’, 48 Journal of 
Common Market Studies (2010) p. 1039.   
30 Carrubba, Murrah, supra n. 27.  
31 Hornuf, Voigt, supra n. 27. 
32 For other relevant work see for instance A.-M.Burley, M.Walter, ‘Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal 
Integration’, 47 International Organization (1993) p. 41; L.Conant, Justice Contained: Law and Politics in the European Union 
(Cornell University Press 2012); R.A.Cichowski, The European Court of Justice and Civil Society (Cambridge University Press 
2007); M.Gabel, C.J.Carrubba, C.Aninsley and D.M.Beaudette, ‘Of Courts and Commerce’, 74 The Journal of Politics 
(2012) p. 1125; Mattli, Slaughter, supra n. 5 ; A. Stone Sweet, The Judicial Construction of Europe (Oxford University Press 2004); 
T.Tridimas, G.Tridimas, ‘National courts and the European Court of Justice: a public choice analysis of the preliminary 
reference procedure’, 24 International Review of Law and Economics (2004) p. 125.   
33 K.J.Alter, J.Vargas, ‘Explaining Variation in the Use of European Litigation Strategies’, 33 Comparative Political Studies 
(2000) p. 452. In a similar vein Claes and Vink claim that: ‘When explaining the use of the procedure across member states 
we need to go beyond a pathological perspective that sees small reference numbers as a sign of a compliance problem.’, see 
M.Claes, M.Vink, ‘Explaining the use of preliminary references by domestic courts in EU Member States: a comparative 
analysis’, Paper presented at 38th Annual UACES Conference in Edinburg, 1-3 September 2008.  
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number of actual preliminary references. The columns in black include judgments, not only enforcing 
CJEU rulings, but also those that have been solved without a reference to the CJEU. The figure seems 
to reflect the extent to which an undoubtedly relevant part of the story on Europeanization remains 
unexplained so far. 
 
Figure 2: EU law judgments and referrals to the CJEU by national courts in EU-15 (1961-2011) 
Source: 
DEC.NAT34 – National Decisions database of the Association of the Councils of State and Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions of the European Union 
& CJEU 2011 Annual report.  
 
The above becomes even more evident when attention is paid to the dockets of particular 
courts accessed via national legal databases. For instance, in the case of the Spanish Supreme Court 
(figure 3), we observe that despite of the very scarce use of the preliminary ruling procedure (1%), the 
Spanish Court frequently refers to the CJEU jurisprudence (45%). This again underscored the necessity 
to extend the study of Europeanization beyond the fact of the number of referred preliminary 
questions and to take into consideration other indicators such as the number of referrals to/citations of 
CJEU rulings in a broad sense.  
 
                                                 
34 Accessed January 2014. 
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Figure 3: Citation practice in EU law cases by the Spanish Supreme Court (2000-2009) 
 
Source: Mayoral,  2013a. 
 
Given that the majority of EU law judgments take place outside the channels of the preliminary 
reference system, it becomes crucial to assess the importance of national court EU-law-related rulings 
for the legal integration35, and, consequently, for the study of national judges’ behaviour as EU judges. 
Studies carried out by, among others, Chalmers, Slepcevic, Hermanin, Evas, and Mayoral36, suggest to 
investigate how the day-to-day application of EU law37 impacts on the national judiciaries and their 
behaviour. By and large, to fully understand the use of preliminary references as an indicator of 
Europeanization of domestic judges we should go deeper in our understanding of how judges deal with 
other dimensions related to preliminary references. In that sense, judicial compliance with CJEU 
precedent as a symbol of Europeanization of judicial behaviour opens up for another stream of 
research that has been scarcely addressed until now. The contemplation regarding how national courts 
deal with CJEU rulings when they are asked to enforce EU law is not trivial. Since the early 2000, 
scholars such as Nyikos have pointed to the fact that national courts almost always follow and apply 
                                                 
35 Conant, supra n. 31, p. 81. 
36  D.Chalmers, ‘The Positioning of EU Judicial Politics within the United Kingdom’ in K. H. Goetz, S. Hix (eds), 
Europeanised Politics? European Integration and National Political Systems (Frank Cass Publishers 2001), at p. 169; Slepcevic, supra n. 
5; C.Hermanin, Europeanization through Judicial Enforcement?: The case of Race Equality Policy (2012) PhD Thesis. 
Department of Political and Social Sciences. European University Institute; Evas, supra n. 3; J.A.Mayoral, The politics of 
judging EU law: a new approach to national courts in the legal integration of Europe (2013b). PhD Thesis. Department of 
Political and Social Sciences. European University Institute. 
37 J.Peterson, ‘Decision-making in the European Union: Towards a framework for analysis’, 2 Journal of European Public 
Policy (1995) p. 69. 
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CJEU rulings in cases which they referred to the Luxembourg Court.38 However, in 6,55 % (11 out 168 
rulings) of cases, national courts evaded or did not comply with the  ruling given by the CJEU.  
From the above it can be concluded that national courts noticeably follow and apply 
interpretations of EU law provided by the CJEU to them, given that the number of non-compliance 
with CJEU preliminary rulings is minor. Nevertheless, if attention is paid to the cases with all kinds of 
citation practices (i.e. also including the application of all other CJEU precedents) contained in EU-law-
related national case law, we observe that the compliance with interpretations of EU law provided by 
the CJEU is lower. For example, in case of Spain 39  and Poland 40  (see table 1 below) in almost 
respectively 81 % and 87 % of the cases national courts did comply with CJEU rulings, while in 19 % 
and 13% of the cases the courts opted for one of modes of non-compliance.41 
Table 1: The Spanish and Polish courts’ treatment of the CJEU rulings (precedent + preliminary rulings) 
 
Spain 
(1986-2000) 
Poland 
(2004-2010) 
 N % N % 
Compliance 132 81 374 87 
Non-compliance 31 19 56 13 
Total 163 100 430 100 
Source: Data sets of Spanish EU law cases by Ramos and Polish EU law cases by Mayoral 2013b. 
 
The evidence, used by Ramos42 and Mayoral to study the importance of legal and political 
motivations43 in CJEU precedents, show the relevance of the question concerning why and how the use 
of other forms of vertical cooperation between national courts and the CJEU affects the process on 
Europeanization of the judiciary. However, despite the evidence showing similar motivations for the 
use of both preliminary rulings and CJEU precedent, there is still a lack of explanations addressing the 
question whether both mechanisms offer different incentives for the behaviour of national judges as 
EU judges. In line with the above data, it seems reasonable to defend the view that CJEU precedents 
give in overall more discretion as regards national courts’ behaviour. In the light of this evidence one 
might wonder which factors are leading to this divergence. Would it perhaps be the lack of monitoring 
                                                 
38 Nyikos, supra n. 4.  
39 See Ramos, supra n. 25;  F.Ramos, ‘Law and Politics in the Application of EC law: Spanish Courts and the CJEU 1986-
2000’, 43 Common Market Law Review (2006) p. 395. 
40 X 2013a. 
41  Non-compliance refers to those instances where the national court “limits” the impact of the CJEU case law, 
“distinguishes” the CJEU ruling after discussing it, and, directly “dissents”, disagrees or criticizes the CJEU ruling. See 
Ramos, supra n. 25.  
42 Ramos, supra n. 25 and Ramos, supra n. 38.  
43 Mayoral 2013a. La politización de la aplicación judicial del Derecho Europeo: un estudio del Tribunal Supremo Español. 
Revista de Estudios Políticos, 161, 117–142. 
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mechanisms as regards the compliance with the CJEU decisions or the difficulties judges are 
confronted with when applying CJEU legal reasoning to national cases? 
The issue concerning the use of EU legal instruments or sources is not exhausted by the 
problem related to the citations and/or application of the Court judgments. Recently, scholars such as 
Jupille and Caporaso emphasized the relevance of the domestication or indigenization of European 
concepts.44 They showed how the domestic discourse of UK judges became increasingly Europeanised 
‘’by the courts' exposure to alien legal concepts emanating from the EU’ 45  such as ‘purposive 
interpretation’, ‘proportionality’ and ‘legitimate expectations’.46 In a similar vein, Corkin pointed to the 
increasing use of, what she called, informal references to the European values or obligations47 by the 
German, Austrian and Italian Constitutional courts. 48 Some explanations for the domestication or 
internalization of various European concepts are offered from political science and legal perspectives. 
Martinsen has pointed to the importance of the CJEU proportionality doctrine as a tool for national 
courts for restraining national and administrative reaction to the judicial Europeanization of their 
national policies.49 In addition, some evidence (table 2) supports the already mentioned inter-court 
competition prediction50 explaining that constitutional courts do not always enforce the principle of 
primacy of EU law because they can interpret it as a reduction of their jurisdiction and powers while 
ordinary (lower) courts are more prone to enforce the principle in order to empower their own position 
vis-à-vis other national authorities.51 
 
Table 2: Distribution of decisions enforcing 
EU law supremacy in Spain (1986-2000) 
Ordinary Courts 67.39 % 
Supreme Court 32.61 % 
Constitutional Court 0 % 
Source: Data set of Spanish EC Law cases by Ramos 
 
The issue of domestication of European concepts by national courts emphasises the idea that 
the process of constitutionalization of EU legal order must be understood as a two-ways process due to 
                                                 
44 Jupille, Caporaso, supra n. 4 
45 Ibid, at 2007.  
46 At this point it should be observed that principles such as proportionality or legitimate expectations do not as such 
originate from EU law. However, by means of EU law they were ‘downloaded’ and disseminated in those national legal 
orders that were not familiar with them.  
47 According to Corkin, the informal reference to “European values and norms” is composed by terms like ‘European 
values and norms’, ‘community obligations, ‘European legal unity’, ‘European integration’, ‘European economic 
community’, ‘European communities’, or similar, Corkin, supra n. 19, at p. 51-52 
48 Corkin, supra n. 19.  
49 D.S. Martinsen, ‘Judicial policy-making and Europeanization: the proportionality of national control and administrative 
discretion, 18 Journal of European public Policy (2011) p. 944.  
50 Alter, supra n. 22.   
51 Ramos, supra n. 38.   
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the important role national courts play in the evolution of EU law principles and doctrines. In that 
matter, it is important to underline how national courts affected the configuration of the EU legal 
system (e.g.  by suggesting the incorporation into the EU legal system of the rule of law and human 
rights standards or common democratic principles and the concept of constitutional identity), and, by 
extension also the process of Europeanization of the judiciaries. In that regard, national courts put 
forward understandings of EU law that are different from those advocated by the CJEU. 
For example, Davies points to the interaction between the CJEU and the German 
Constitutional Court when the former aimed at creating the legal principles of EU law (e.g. primacy and 
direct effect) as a two-way dynamic process. ‘While, on the one hand, primacy and direct effect and the 
use of the preliminary ruling mechanism served to Europeanize national legal orders in a 'top-down' 
sense, the uploading effect of the Federal Constitutional Court's Solange jurisprudence served to 
Europeanize a national tradition in a 'bottom-up' manner.’52 In this regard, the conflict created by the 
Solange doctrine or the recent preliminary reference from German Constitutional Court 53  had a 
systematic impact that influenced the design of the EU legal order and judiciary by shaping the 
relationship and allocation of competences between national courts and the CJEU. In this regard, 
Advocate General Cruz Villalón has recently referred to the public law of the Member States as a 
source of inspiration for interpreting EU law categories and concepts.54 
Nevertheless, the use of CJEU rulings and doctrines does not reflect the full extension of top-
down instruments available to national judges for the integration of EU law in their legal systems. The 
fact that national courts in their daily practice deal with and (directly) apply legislative sources of EU 
law such as Treaty provisions, regulations, or directives– which are the core carriers of EU law - seems 
partly disregarded. Taking again the example of the Spanish Supreme Courts, we can observe in figure 
4 that while the Supreme Court cites CJEU ruling quite often (5282 times in the researched period), the 
total number of references to EU legal sources, thus including primary and secondary law of the Union, 
is much higher  (8577 times).  
 
                                                 
52 B.Davies, Resisting the European Court of Justice: West Germany's Confrontation with European Law, 1949–1979 
(Cambridge University Press 2012) at p. 220-221. 
53 ECJ 16 June 2015, Case C-62/14, Gauweiler and Others.  
54 Opinion AG P.Cruz Villalón, 19 December 2013 in Case C‑ 427/12, European Commission v European Parliament and Council 
of the European Union.  
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Figure 4: Citations of CJEU rulings and EU legislation by the Spanish Supreme Court (1986-2013)
 
Source: Data from iCourts’ project ‘Supreme Courts as Gatekeepers: Studying Patterns of Supreme Courts Reaction to European Legal Integration’ by M. 
Wind, K. Schaldemose & J. A. Mayoral.  Presented in  the “Implementaiton and Judicial Politics: Conflict and Compliance in the EU multi-level system” 
workshop. March 3-4, 2016. WZB, Berlin. 
 
The integration of primary and secondary EU law sources in the day-to-day practice  national 
courts seems to be the most evident and relevant (also in terms of numbers) example of top-down 
Europeanization of national judges’ behaviour. Despite the incontestable fact that EU legislation might 
affect the behaviour of national courts, the issue remains for its large part unexplored. For instance, 
different behavioural patterns might be found depending on the legal or policy area that is being 
explored (e.g. competition, civil or criminal law), or on the existence of a national law implementing the 
concerned EU legislation. Certainly, many legal scholars do address the problem of the application of 
those EU law instruments by national courts, but the available studies are somewhat limited (to seminal 
cases, to a specific Member State, specific policy field, specific type of jurisdiction or even a specific 
national court) in their scope.55 The reason of the foregoing is simple, i.e. the issue is particularly 
difficult or in some instances virtually impossible to be researched on a broader scale.  
In this regard, we can go deeper by studying the degree of compliance with EU legislation. One 
example of this approach comes from Bapuly and Kohlegger who identified potential errors that might 
                                                 
55 See note 2.  
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occur while applying EU law by higher courts in Austria.56 The data shown in table 3, despite its 
limitations due to the short period considered, illustrates some aspects related to compliance, which 
could be caused by, for instance, the lack of knowledge and skills among judges who serve at those 
courts. 
 
Table 3: Decisions in Austrian high courts (1995-2003)57 
Compliance with EU law58 Supreme Court 
Supreme 
Administrative 
Court 
Constitutional 
Court 
 Cases % Cases % Cases % 
- Fully comply 55 55% 90 62% 36 90% 
- Consent on the overall result, 
but with mistakes 
37 37% 45 30% 4 10% 
- EU law was ignored, not 
applied, reference wrongly denied 
8 8% 11 8% 0 0 
Total 100 100% 146 100% 40 100% 
Source: Bapuly, 2003. 
 
Regarding the above, it is interesting to see how the Austrian Constitutional Court correctly 
applied EU law in most of the cases (90%) and was involved in minor mistakes only a few times (10%). 
This is different is the case of both Austrian Supreme Courts that were involved in a large number of 
EU law cases, but whose success rate amounts to half of them. This can serve as an inspiration for new 
and more accurate research testing the degree of Europeanization of courts by looking at the level of 
compliance with EU legislation and not only with CJEU rulings. For example, these findings on compliance 
with EU law rise many questions if seen in the light of more recent evidence showing how experience 
with resorting to and applying EU law increase judges’ knowledge of EU law by means of a learning by 
doing process.59 This triggers a question whether there are any institutional arrangement between courts, 
not only high but also for ordinary lower courts, that might explain the variations in the degree of 
compliance with EU law. In this regard, very little research and data exists explaining why some 
national courts show more compliance than other. But once the problems for data collection are 
                                                 
56 B.Bapuly, The Application of EC law in Austria, 39 IWE Working Paper Series (2003); B.Bapuly, G.Kohlegger, Die 
Implementierung des EG-Rechts in Österreich (2003) Die Gerichtsbarkeit. MANZ'sche: Wien; B.Bapuly, ‘The role of the 
(highest) judiciary in the supranational European legal order’ in S.Puntscher-Riekmann, M.Mokre, and Michael Latzer (eds), 
The state of Europe: transformations of statehood from a European perspective (Campus Verl 2002) at p. 329. 
57 This survey includes only those decisions that did not lead to a preliminary ruling reference. Hence, it excludes the 199 
references to the CJEU made until June 2003. 
58 The authors scrutinized whether national courts applied or followed the requirements imposed by the EU legislation 
and/or CJEU rulings when applying EU law. 
59 J.A.Mayoral, U.Jaremba, & T.Nowak, ‘Creating EU law judges: the role of generational differences, legal education and 
judicial career paths in national judges’ assessment regarding EU law knowledge.’ Journal of European Public Policy (2014) 
p. 1–22. 
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overcome, one could ask a question whether compliance with EU law can be explained by resorting to 
the already existing  accounts in EU studies scholarship that argue that national judges have interest in 
keeping the coherence of the EU legal system or to foster their own policy/legal preferences.  
 
THE IMPACT OF ALTERNATIVE JUDICIAL MODES OF GOVERNANCE: FORMAL AND INFORMAL 
NETWORKS 
Recently, the problem concerning the use of contacts or networks for the exchange of information and 
the process of EU law knowledge dissemination among national judges has been emphasized. In these 
studies, the formal and informal exchange of information or knowledge in epistemological 
communities is seen as an essential part of improving the judicial dialogue/cooperation, knowledge, 
and dissemination of European concepts. As illustrated in figure 5, most judges consult their fellow 
judges to resolve their concerns or deficiencies in EU law. Also noteworthy is the use of national legal 
networks, followed by the use of international judicial networks, academic colleagues and the public 
prosecutor. One can also notice the existence, though scarce, of contacts of judges with judges from 
other Member States and members of the CJEU.  
 
Figure 5: Actors consulted for the resolution of EU law cases by Spanish judges (frequencies) 
 
       Source: X, 2013b. N=130 Spanish judges 
 
 
The recent literature on networks tries to test the impact of the horizontal and vertical top-down 
relations as an additional forum of judicial dialogue by exploring the connections national judges have 
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with most of the actors showed in the figure above. At the individual level, judges with extensive 
personal networks have greater access and opportunities to test their knowledge of EU law, and in 
consequence, to improve it.60 In some countries, these networks are institutionalized in the form of 
regular meetings between national judges dealing with the latest developments in the field of EU law 
(e.g. RED-UE in Spain) or the specialization of a formally designated judge who provides information 
on EU legislation to their peers (e.g. the coordinator of European law in the Netherlands).61 Moreover, 
national judges can enter into dialogue with colleagues from other Member States in European and 
international networks whereby they improve their knowledge of other legal systems and exchange 
experiences and ideas about EU law, and contribute to the construction of a European community of 
judges and development and implementation of European legal policies.62  
 Two types of networks by their origins and finalities are identified. First, top-down 
networks mainly institutionalized by EU institutions with the aim of coordinating and supporting 
national judiciaries and councils, e.g. the European Judicial Training Network (EJTN). Next to that, 
there are bottom-up networks created by for instance national judicial councils or associations of judges. 
What is more interesting about networks for the purposes of Europeanization studies, is how these 
institutions integrate dynamics that may contribute to the Europeanization of judges and courts: both 
combine vertical dialogue between European and national courts and horizontal dialogue among 
national judges themselves, through which standards are set up and the interpretations of legal rules are 
discussed. For example, their discussions serve to establish the conditions under which preliminary 
references should be asked, or how the acte clair doctrine or the principles of direct or indirect effect 
should be applied. This allows the networks to work as mechanism for not only downloading policies 
and guidelines from the EU to the Member State' courts, but also for uploading policies and 
                                                 
60 Ibid. 
61 T.Nowak, F.Amtenbrink, M.Hertogh & M.Wissink, National Judges as European Union Judges: Knowledge, Experiences 
and Attitudes of Lower Court Judges in Germany and the Netherlands (Eleven International Publishing 2011). 
62 M.Claes, M. De Visser, ‘Are You Networked Yet? On Dialogues in European Judicial Networks’, 8 Utrecht Law Review 
(2012) p. 100; M.Claes, M. De Visser, ‘Courts United? On European Judicial Networks’, in A. Vauchez and B. De Witte 
(eds), Lawyering Europe: European Law as a Transnational Social Field (Hart Publishing 2013) at p. 75; S.Benvenuti,’National 
Supreme Courts and the EU Legal Order: Building a European Judicial Community through Networking’, 6 Perspectives on 
Federalism (2014); S.Benvenuti, ‘Access to Justice in Environmental Matters. Which Role for the European Networks of 
Judges?’, 11 Journal for European Environmental & Planning Law (2014) p. 165; C.Dallara, R.Amato, ‘Judicial and Legal 
Expert Networks. New Actors for a EU Area of Justice?’ Paper for conference: National courts vis-à-vis EU law: new 
issues, theories & methods, 29-30 November 2012, European University Institute; D.Piana, C. Dallara , Networking the Rule of 
Law: How Change Agents Reshape Judicial Governance in the EU (Ashgate 2015); M.Magrassi, ‘Reconsidering the Principle of 
Separation of Powers: Judicial Networking and Institutional Balance in the Process of European Integration’, 3 
Contemporary Readings in Law & Social Justice (2011) p. 159; A. Vauchez, ‘Introduction. Euro-lawyering, Transnational 
Social Fields and European Polity-Building’, in A.Vauchez, B.De Witte (eds), Lawyering Europe. European Law as a 
Transnational Social Field (Hart Publishing 2013), p.1 at p. 1.  
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recommendations to the level of the Union, which may later impact the process of Europeanization of 
national judiciaries. 
 In this last regard Benvenuti studied the importance of judicial networks for constructing 
a European judicial culture.63 He showed how the EJTN, despite its decentralized and complementary 
character (Member States still bear the main responsibility to train magistrates in EU law), had an 
impact on the implementation of judicial training by defining priorities, guidelines and needs within the 
area of the judicial application of EU law64. He also addressed the relevance of horizontal judicial 
networks, such as the 'Network of the Presidents of the Supreme Judicial Courts' and the 'Association 
of the Council of State and Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions of the European Union (ACA-
Europe)' for improving the understanding of the preliminary reference mechanism and judicial 
cooperation. 
More informal modes of dialogue have also been identified as useful for the reduction of the 
risk of constitutional conflicts between the CJEU and national (high) courts. This is the case of bilateral 
meetings organised by the CJEU with small delegations of high-ranked national judges in closed-door 
meeting65, where the discussion is focused on understanding the problems and limitations regarding the 
application of EU law and CJEU decisions. As the author remarked, these meetings existed since the 
nineties and have been growing in size as the process of enlargement of the EU proceeded and the 
complexity of EU law increased. For the purpose of Europeanization, these meetings have the virtue to 
increase the understanding and knowledge of EU law, the preliminary reference mechanism and the 
position of the CJEU and generate mutual empathy, trust and tolerance to different legal positions 
which consequently might help to influence the opinions of national judges and increase cooperation 
and compliance with CJEU rulings. 
While the interaction between judges seems obvious due to their corporativism, more evidence 
on whether and how national judges are related with non-judicial actors relevant for their behaviour as 
EU judges is still lacking. Some studies referred to these types of informal interactions that may shape 
or constrain the opinions and discretion of national judges when they consider EU law. An example of 
these informal pressures has been discussed by Szukala for the case of France: “Since the mid-nineties, 
the French government has had a quite proactive policy on preliminary rulings that culminated in 1997 
in a monitoring arrangement which more or less binds the French courts to governmental processes. 
                                                 
63 Benvenuti, supra n. 61. 
64 S.Benvenuti, ‘The European Judicial Training Network and Its Role in the Strategy for the Europeanization of National 
Judges’, 7 International Journal for Court Administration (2015)  p. 59. 
65 N.Leron, ‘The Constitutional Governance of Judges in the EU: The invention of a communicative mode of regulation of 
constitutional conflict risks’, ECPR General Conference. Conference paper (2014). 
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The Minister for Justice’s European department (SAEI) in co-operation with the Secrétariat Général du 
Comité Interministériel (SGCI), organises control of the ‘appropriateness’ when courts bring Article 
234 EC matters before the CJEU. The SGCI also intervenes, organising inter-ministerial meetings to 
define a common strategy concerning the question raised, and—if necessary—to ‘reformulate the 
preliminary ruling suggested by the party from which the demand for a ruling emanates.’ 66  The 
independence of French courts to request the CJEU to give a ruling thereon seems to be of minor 
importance, e.g. when French budgetary interests are at stake.” 67 A similar mechanism of de-
europeanization was found by Wind, Martinsen and Pons in case of Denmark.68 They discovered that an 
important reason for ‘not making any (or very few) preliminary referrals was the discouragement from 
the state adviser. Moreover, 41.1 % of the judges in the lower courts stated that it is up to the High 
Court alone to decide whether or not a case ought to be referred to the CJEU.’ 69  Both above-
mentioned examples trigger a question as to how governments or related public administration bodies 
look for modes to influence and shape the behaviour of national judges as EU judges. In these cases, 
two formally institutionalized mechanism are identified; informal mechanisms 70 , however, are still 
unexplored whereas it is likely that they are relevant for influencing judges’ behaviour while dealing 
with EU law. 
In contrast to these approaches, there are other interesting contributions from sociology and 
history that stress out the relevance of networks and socialization. These studies refer to the role played 
by European advocates71, Euro-law associations (e.g. FIDE), pro-European transnational networks and 
fora, and their members and participants (lawyers, judges, politicians or EU officers), who supported 
the constitutional practices of the Court, such as the acceptance of the EU law primacy practice.72 In 
                                                 
66 A.Szukala, ‘France: the European Transformation of the French Model’ in W. Wessels, A. Maurer and J. Mittag (eds), 
Fifteen Into One? The European Union and its Member States (Manchester University Press 2013), at p. 216. 
67 Szukala, supra n. 65, at p. 238. 
68 Wind, Martinsen and Rotger, supra n. 5.  
69 ibid, at p. 76.  
70 M.Llanos, C.T.Weber, C.Heyl and A.Stroh, ‘Informal interference in the judiciary in new democracies: a comparison of 
six African and Latin American cases.’ Democratization (2015) p. 1.  
71 K.J.Alter, ‘Jurist Advocacy Movement in Europe: The Role of Euro Law Associations in European Integration (1953-
1975)’ in K.J.Alter (ed), The European Court’s Political Power: Selected Essays (Oxford University Press 2009), at p. 63; A. Bernier, 
‘Constructing and Legitimating: Transnational Jurist Networks and the Making of a Constitutional Practice of European 
Law. 1950-70’, 21 Contemporary European History (2012) p. 399; M.Rasmussen, ‘Establishing a Constitutional Practice: 
The Role of the European Law Associations’ in W.Kaiser, J.H. Meyer (eds), Societal Actors in European Integration: Polity-
Building and Policy-Making 1958-1992 (Palgrave Macmillan 2013), at p. 173; A. Vauchez, ‘The Making of the European 
Union’s Constitutional Foundations: The Brokering Role of Legal Entrepreneurs and Networks’ in W.Kaiser, B.Leucht and 
M.Gehler (eds), Transnational Networks in Regional Integration Governing Europe 1945-83 (Palgrave Macmillan 2013), at p. 108; 
A.Vauchez, Brokering Europe: Euro-Lawyers and the Making of a Transnational Polity (Cambridge University Press 2015). See also 
Vauchez, supra n. 61.  
72 M. Rasmussen, ‘Rewriting the History of European Public Law: The New Contribution of Historians’, 28 American 
University International Law Review (2013) p. 1187. Davies, supra n. 51, p. 89. 
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contrast, national networks, reluctant to the interpretations of EU law coming from Luxembourg, 
aimed at articulating strategic position vis-à-vis CJEU for shaping EU law differently.73 In this last 
regard, historians and socio-legal researches identified the relevance of national networks for shaping 
and filtering the interpretations coming from the CJEU that might influence the Europeanization of 
national judiciaries. However, the contemporary role of domestic networks, such as aforementioned 
RED-UE in Spain74 composed by national judges who are experts in EU law and whose main role is to 
disseminate the knowledge of EU law and assist their peers in the application thereof, is still not very 
well-known. Considering the nature of those kind of networks, it would be interesting to know why 
they are formed and what their different role is. One could namely pose a question whether it is a 
deliberate strategy to lobby in favour of EU law at the national level or to influence the path of 
Europeanization of the judiciaries in national and/or international fora. Another relevant question to 
be answered is whether domestic networks might increase the communication and implementation of 
judicial training guidelines between the EU level and between member states. Finally, one might 
wonder what the profile of the relevant judges is (e.g. former CJEU judges or référendaires , academics, 
judges from specific jurisdictions) and how those profiles influence their functioning. 
Additionally, the proliferation of networks gives the impression that there is a broad network of 
social interactions which has successful impact on the behaviour of national judges. However, recent 
data collected by Benvenuti (table 4) on the actual involvement of national judges in some of those 
networks, triggers a question whether the relevance of judicial networks for policy-making, enhancing 
interactions or trust is not overestimated. It is against this background that new questions arise 
concerning the determinants of judges’ involvement or the conditions under which some judicial 
networks are more successful than others, especially taking into consideration the fragmented and lousy 
features of the networking landscape. For instance, do those judges belong to a judicial elite that 
actively participates in all kinds of networks or, maybe, by the contrary, all judges are represented 
regardless the jurisdiction they adjudicate in and the rank they have? Other questions that one may pose 
concern for instance the reasons why some judges are more active than others, what motivations lie 
behind their participation and how this participation translates at the national level.  
 
 
                                                 
73 Davies, supra n. 51.  
74  http://www.poderjudicial.es/cgpj/es/Temas/Redes-Judiciales/Red-de-Expertos-en-Derecho-de-la-Union-Europea--
REDUE- 
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Table 4: Frequency of judges’ participation in networks activities (2005-2014) 
                                                    Individual judges’            
involvement 
Networks 
Membership 
and/or 
participation in 
1 activity 
Between 2 
and 4 
More than 5 
Association of the Councils of State and Supreme 
Administrative jurisdictions (ACA-Europe) 
153 45 37 
Association of the European Administrative Judges  217 22 47 
EU Forum of Judges for the Environment (EUFJE) 104 9 13 
Source: Benvenuti’s data provided for this purpose. According to the data, in ACA-Europe, members are the courts as such; and court presidents 
participate together with advisors/contact points who are judges from the same Court. In EUFJE the membership is individual. In AEAJ, national judicial 
associations are formally members but representatives of those associations also participate. 
 
Claes75 and Nyikos76 suggested the importance of former members of the CJEU to change the 
position of national high courts towards the principle of primacy of EU law. Current evidence about 
judges' positions after serving at the Court (table 5) shows that 11 out of 91 CJEU justices return to 
their countries as judges occupying high rank positions within the judiciary. It might seem as a low 
number, but becoming a national judge is the most preferred option among former CJEU judges, 
followed by taking a post of university professor. Both positions are relevant to the extent that these 
judges may still play an important role by increasing high courts' awareness of EU law and educating 
new generations of the judges. 
 
Table 5: Judges' position after the Court 
National judge 11 
Judge at the ECtHR 1 
Politician/Administration 4 
Lawyer 2 
Professor 10 
Other* 32 
Still at the Court 31 
Total  91 
Source: iCourts’ dataset on International Judges by Mikael Rask Madsen. 
*Other: Retired, dead, sick or missing data. 
 
Finally, it is relevant to remark the impact of academia and specifically, EU law journals 
themselves, which played a key role in the transnational forging of the discipline and in the 
                                                 
75 Claes, supra n. 5, p. 262.  
76 Nyikos, supra n. 4, p. 191 the author gives the example of Mr. Galmont who was nominated to serve as a CJEU judge: 
‘After his tenure in Luxembourg, he returned to the Conseil d’État. One short year later, the “renegade” supreme court 
ended its 15 –year isolationism and publicly accepted the supremacy of EU law in the Nicolo case.’ 
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‘normalisation’ of the constitutional reading of the Treaties, also among judges. 77  Figure 5 above 
illustrates how national judges contact their colleagues in the academia when they have doubts in EU 
law cases. Complementary data shows that 33% of the judges use law legal journals as a source assisting 
them to judge in EU-law-related cases78. The two above-discussed research problems regarding the 
impact of former CJEU judges and broadly understood academic world on the Europeanization of 
national judges are still unexplored and open new venues for exploring and establishing causal 
relationships  between, for instance, the appointment of  former CJEU judges, Advocate Generals or 
référendaires as national judges and the implementation of new judicial training programmes or 
openness of the judiciary towards EU law. Likewise, a deeper study concerning the role of academic or 
legal education institutions seems necessary, not only for the increasing of judges’ knowledge and skills 
for dealing with EU law, but also for building a network of national judges with a clear identification as 
EU judges. In that regard, it would be interesting to see the impact that academic institutions or 
associations like the European University Institute, Fédération Internationale pour le Droit Européen, 
the Academy of European Law and the College of Europe may exert. 
 
NEW SOCIO-LEGAL APPROACHES TO EUROPEANIZATION  
Another stream of research points to the relevance of legal-sociological factors such as judicial 
experience, knowledge and preferences for the processes of enforcement of EU law by national 
judges.79 The scholars, by resorting to different methodological tools, attempt to show how national 
judiciaries actually perceive the role imposed on them by EU law, how they experience this role in their 
judicial practice, and, foremost whether they are capable of exercising the tasks. This new approach 
appeared as a reaction to the already existing scholarly accounts in which assumptions where made 
about national judges’ preferences and whether those could predict behaviour as EU judges. Hence, 
this trend attempts to overcome the limited availability of proper indicators reflecting the profile of 
national judges such as attitudes or skills, which has always been present in the discussion. 
Different micro-dynamics related to judging activity and socialization within the judicial 
profession are identified that potentially have an important modifying impact on national judges' 
                                                 
77 S.L. Mudge, & A. Vauchez, ‘Building Europe on a Weak Field: Law, Economics, and Scholarly Avatars in Transnational 
Politics’, 188 American Journal of Sociology (2012) p. 449. 
78 J.A.Mayoral, D.Ordóñez Solís, & D.Berberoff, ‘Los jueces españoles como jueces de la Unión Europea.’ Civitas. Revista 
Española de Derecho Europeo (2013) p. 127. 
79 Bobek, supra n. 3 ; J.Coughlan, ‘Judicial Training in the EU: A study for the European Parliament’, 13 ERA Forum (2012) 
p. 1; Nowak et al. 2011; Jaremba 2014; Mayoral 2013b.  
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profiles as EU judges. One of the proxies used to measure the Europeanization of national judges’ 
profiles is the level of knowledge of EU law that national judges have:   
 
 
 
Table 6: Distribution of EU law knowledge among judges (%) 
Level of EU law 
knowledge 
% (Number of judges) 
Bad 13.28% (85) 
Moderate 34.38% (220) 
Reasonable 40.31% (258) 
Good 11.25% (72) 
Very Good 0.78% (5) 
Source: Mayoral et al., 2014. 
 
 
It has been illustrated that on average the knowledge of EU law is assessed as the highest by those 
judges who are more experienced in their daily practice, trained, networked, knowledgeable in national 
law, and better educated in EU law. 80 The authors also illustrated how these differences are correlated 
with some contextual or institutional factors the judges operate in. In that sense, judges serving in 
higher courts and adjudicating in the field of administrative law have higher rates of EU law knowledge. 
These studies also allow to map the skills, attitudes, values, and identity of judges. For instance, they 
help to understand how judges comprehend their role as EU judges and to what extent they agree with 
the central principles of EU law. It seems plausible to assume that judges’ positions or attitudes 
towards these issues may influence, to some extent, their decisions that involve EU-law-related 
problems. As an example, recent data from the Spanish judiciary shows how the majority of the 
surveyed judges  amounting to 60% of the group, identify themselves with the role of EU law judges, 
while the rest of the group rejects it or has an indifferent attitude towards it.81  
 A similar agreement is observed with the primacy of EU law (figure 6). 82 In this case a 
widespread acceptance of the principle of primacy is noticed (69%). 
                                                 
80 Mayoral et al. 2014. 
81 Mayoral et al. 2013. N= 128 judges. 
82 The notion of ‘supremacy’ or ‘primacy”’ of European law, which implies that EU law takes precedence above national law 
in case of conflict, is far from being a clear concept as it has been conceived in different ways by different courts. While the 
CJEU understands it more extensively, national courts clearly tried to delimit its scope. For example, we can see how the 
Spanish Constitutional Court came up with its own understandings of concepts such as ‘primacy’. See 
http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/es/jurisprudencia/restrad/Paginas/DTC122004en.aspx. Since the issue is both 
conceptually and theoretically a complex one, we restrain ourselves to only referring to it, without discussing it any further.  
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Figure 6: Agreement with EU law primacy (%) 
Source: Mayoral et 
al., 2013. n=122. Spanish judges. 
 
In a similar vein, a new research agenda has been proposed arguing for the relevance of trust 
for the functioning of the EU judicial system.83 It is claimed that judges are more prone to follow CJEU 
jurisprudence when they have (higher) trust in European Union institution84. In this sense, given the 
importance of the institutional trust for the implementation of EU law, it is necessary to consider the 
extent to which judges have confidence in the various judicial and political institutions at the national 
and European level. Based on the Spanish judges case (figure 7) two interesting conclusions are drawn. 
First, judges generally have more trust in EU political and judicial institutions than their national 
counterparts. Second, it is illustrated how the judges, by pure corporate sense, have more confidence in 
judicial institutions than political ones. Similar patterns have been found among German, Dutch and 
Polish judges.85 Nevertheless, it would be interesting to observe member states like Denmark and 
France where national judges have a strong deference towards their parliamentarian sovereignty 
compare to constitutional system like Germany or Spain. 
                                                 
83 Mayoral 2013b. 
84 Mayoral 2015. 
85 Mayoral 2015. 
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Figure 7: Trust in National and EU Institutions (% of judges who “trust” or “trust very much”) 
Source: Mayoral 
et al., 2013. n=124-128. Spanish judges 
 
 It is against this background that new research questions regarding the determinants of trust in EU 
institutions, with special attention to the CJEU arise.  Which factors make national judges trust in the 
CJEU and do other sociological factors influence their trust in the CJEU like generalized trust? How 
the conception of judicial trust might contribute to the idea of mutual recognition86 where trust has 
been identified as a relevant principle governing the relationship between national judges when 
enforcing cross-border decisions like the European Arrest Warrant? The above-mentioned questions 
offer only a very limited selection of possible research venues concerning trust as a relevant factor for 
the construction of a European judiciary. 
The foregoing studies have brought a new perspective on how to deal with individual 
characteristics of judges and the potential influence of those characteristic on the functioning of judges 
as EU judges.  This research trend should necessarily be seen through the prism of large 
methodological difficulties that scholars come across in order to collect massive data and fulfil the 
essential requirement of representativeness which would allow for   making a comparison across EU 
and between different member states and assessing how contextual differences might interact with the 
                                                 
86 M.P.Maduro ‘So close and yet so far: the paradoxes of mutual recognition’, 14 Journal of European Public Policy (2007) 
p. 814; K. Nicolaïdis ‘Trusting the Poles? Constructing Europe through mutual recognition’, 14 Journal of European Public 
Policy (2007) p. 682; S. K. Schmidt, ‘Mutual recognition as a new mode of governance’, 14 Journal of European Public 
Policy (2007) p. 667.  
60,16 
28,57 
40,48 
29,60 
32,80 
76,98 
42,40 
80,65 
European Union
National Government
European Comission
National Parliament
European Parliament
Supreme Court
Constitutional Court
CJEU
  29 
personal characteristics of the judges. For that purpose, larger and more ambitious projects that have 
the capacity to collect systematic and representative data among national judges from the EU-28 
Member States should be conducted. One must be aware of various limitations as regards the extension 
and generalization of the conclusions from these studies. Also, while the empirical data concerning 
judges’ profiles data proves very useful for explaining contemporary phenomena related with the EU-
peanizaiton of national judges, it seems very limited for the study or revision of previous research from 
history, law and political science. . 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The process of Europeanization of national judiciaries is an intriguing and intricate problem that can be 
looked at and researched from different perspectives. As illustrated, through the last decades 
multifarious hypotheses, theories and explanations concerning the Europeanization of national 
judiciaries have been drawn. However, when we look at scholarly efforts in this field, we should 
emphasize the difficulty to rationalize the debate due to the methodological and theoretical obstacles 
that the researchers come across. In many instances the problem already starts at the very basic level of 
conceptualization. Therefore, producing reliable figures with a robust method and then trying to 
catalogue the findings to produce generalized conclusions seems quite a challenging (and sometimes 
impossible) task indeed. There remain many areas in which the Europeanization of judiciaries can 
hardly and/or effectively be measured.   
This article aimed at, first, confirming the view that the process of Europeanization goes 
beyond the top-down processes of courts’ participation in the preliminary ruling procedure and their 
compliance with the CJEU rulings, and, second, providing a wider array of new angles, questions, 
variables and indicators that not only broaden the existent scholarship but also add another dimension 
to it. For the sake of Europeanization studies, it seems valuable to look into the problems of, for 
instance, the impact of formal and informal judicial networks on the process but it also seems essential 
to look into different extra-legal - mostly sociological - variables, such as for instance the knowledge of 
EU law among judges and their experiences with the application of EU law, that may play a role. This, 
in turn, opens up a whole new stream in the research agenda which is crucial for the fuller 
understanding of the processes of Europeanization of national courts. However, it should be 
underscored that to elaborate an appropriate measure of Europeanization is a large project in terms of 
data collection extracted from surveys, historical archives, rulings collections or interviews.  By now, we 
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are in possession of data concerning the attributes and behaviour of national judges for a few Member 
States only. This data is however sufficient to show in which way Europeanization should be 
understood and, hopefully it can encourage other scholars to work in that direction and to gather new 
evidence that can contribute to such a big enterprise. 
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